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Control Preference and Financial
Attributes: Founders as CEOs in
Small, Publicly Traded Firms
William R. Lane
Mel Jameson

Existing theories o f the firm are silent with respect to cross-sectional differences
in performance or characteristics o f firms attributable to different types of
managers. We hypothesize that the investment, financing and dividend deci
sions of founders differ systematically from those of nonfounder managers as a
result of 1) founders valuing control more highly than do nonfounders, a con
dition we refer to as the control retention effect, and 2) founders being associ
ated with younger, faster growing firms, a condition we label the life cycle effect.
Our findings are that both effects are at work, but in different decision areas.
No evidence is found that founders exploit their status to extract higher direct
compensation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Financial analysis of the firm has traditionally been based on the neoclassi
cal economic model of shareholder wealth maximization. More recently,
agency theoretic models have recognized conflicts of interest, and the
resulting interaction, between shareholders and managers. In neither
model, however, is there room for differences in managerial behavior except
in response to differing economic stimuli. Consequently, little attention has
been given to cross-sectional differences in performance or characteristics
of firms attributable to different types of managers. In this paper we inves
tigate the proposition that one class of managers, founders, makes financial
decisions that differ systematically from those of other managers. Specifi
cally, we investigate the influence that founder status of the chief executive
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officer has on the firm's investing, financing, and dividend pohcy decisions.
As a corollary, we also investigate whether founder status affects the CEO's
direct compensation.
There is little empirical evidence of cross-sectional differences in
firms being associated with managerial attributes. The extensive literature
on takeovers as a disciplinary part of the managerial labor market, while
implying that some managers are “better” than others with respect to
shareholder wealth maximization, does not suggest a taxonomy of manag
ers. Demsetz and Lehn [3] speculate that some managers seek to head
media and sports firms because of the “amenity potential” of those indus
tries, but they do not interpret their results as evidence that such industry
preferences systematically alter the performance of those managers' firms.
Holderness and Sheehan [9] find firms with a majority blockholder exhibit
larger advertising expenditures than other firms, but are not different with
respect to research and development expenses, capital expenditures or
Tobin's q ratio. They also find no evidence that majority blockholders
expropriate wealth. Holderness and Sheehan [9, p. 323, n. II] suggest
without elaboration that majority shareholders who are founders might
have a different effect on firm performance than nonfounders holding
majority blocks.
We hypothesize that founders systematically value control more highly
than do nonfounders, and that this preference influences their decisions.
We refer to this inclination as the control retention effect. One factor that
could confound the control retention effect is that founders are also more
likely to head younger, faster growing firms, a condition that is also likely to
affect their choices. We label this influence as the life cycle effect. In our
empirical work, we compare a sample of founder managed and nonfounder
managed firms. We assume that the endogenous policy decisions of the
firm are revealed in the firm's financial characteristics, and that those deci
sions reflect both the manager's individual preferences (i.e., the control
retention effect) and the firm's exogenous investment opportunities (i.e.,
the life cycle effect).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we develop the two
hypotheses in more detail, and examine the support for each in the litera
ture. Section II focuses the analysis on areas in which decision making
would be expected to differ under each of the hypotheses. From this basis,
we define the specific variables we use to measure the various decisions and
predict the effect of founder status on them under both hypotheses. In Sec
tion III we describe the sample and methodology. We report our empirical
results in Section ly and our conclusions in Section V
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II. FOUNDER STATUS AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS
A. The Control Retention Hypothesis

One possible difference between founders and other managers is in
the degree of attachment to “their” enterprises. Several studies have shown
that control is valued in the market. Meeker and Joy [17], Lease, McCon
nell, and Mikkelson [15], Jarrell and Poulsen [11], and Partch [23] find evi
dence of this in the pricing of dual voting rights classes of stock. Similar
evidence of the market value of control is reported by Walkling and Long
[29] (among many others) in studies of the behavior of equity prices around
acquisitions, and by Dodd and Warner [4] and Pound [25] in their studies
of proxy fights. Holderness and Sheehan [9], while finding no evidence
that majority shareholders expropriate wealth, cite the managerial involve
ment of majority shareholders as evidence of benefits to owning large
blocks. Stulz [28] argues that the benefits of control of voting rights affects
both the firm's capital structure and the proportion of the firm's equity held
by insiders.
While some of the value placed on control undoubtedly stems from a
desire to make value enhancing changes in operations, at least some of it
seems to derive from a preference for control for its own sake. For,owners
of small businesses, there is direct evidence on this point. Galante [7]
reports the results of a survey of owners of small businesses and finds “con
trol” identified second only to “pride in product/service” as a source of sat
isfaction.
Beyond these indications that control matters in general, some litera
ture suggests that founders, on average, hold even more tightly to control
of “their” enterprise than do nonfounder managers. Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny [18, p. 106] write that founders “... might play a special role in the
company ... because their attachment to the company is more than just
financial.” Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [19] cite founder status as a source
of entrenchment, and report (among other findings) that founder status
among the top officers adversely affects a measure of the firm's perfor
mance. Elsewhere, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny [18, 20] present evidence
that founders are less susceptible to removal by boards of directors or by
hostile takeover than are other managers. That is, founders have found it
possible or desirable to entrench themselves more firmly than nonfounding
managers. Evidence consistent with founders using this stronger entrench
ment in ways detrimental to the value of the firm is presented by Johnson
et al. [13]. They report a significant positive response to the death of a
senior corporate executive who is a founder, and a negative response for the
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death of nonfounders. ^ Taken together with the evidence on entrench
ment, this raises the possibility that founders' tighter control of their firms
leads to different decision making behavior
We refer to this explanation for differences between founders and
other managers as the “control retention” hypothesis. Compared to other
managers, founders bias any decision involving a tradeoff between mana
gerial control and value maximization toward control retention.
/

B. The Life Cycle Hypothesis

Founder m anaged firms are likely to be younger firms than non
founder managed firms. The problems faced in the early phases of a firm's
existence, and the managerial talents required to overcome them, differ
from those faced in maturity. Holmes and Schmitz [10] present an eco
nomic model of optimal allocation of managerial resources, whereby those
with a comparative advantage in entrepreneurship repeatedly found corpo
rations and then turn operations over to those with more traditional man
agerial talents. In such a model, both the economic constraints faced by
founder managed firms and the personality characteristics of their manag
ers differ from those of nonfounder managed firms.
This idea is embodied in the notion of a “life-cycle” of a firm. The
usual version of this product/firm life cycle identifies four phases: pioneer
ing (or start-up), expansion (or growth), maturity, and decline. Cooper and
Dunkelberg [2], consistent with Holmes and Schmitz [10], note that the dif
ferent phases of the traditional life cycle require different managerial skills.
We take the essential points of this exposition to be that newer firms 1) have
a relatively richer set of growth opportunities, and 2) face relatively greater
informational asymmetries in obtaining financing. The first of these obser
vations can be interpreted to mean that firms in the early phases of the life
cycle have a lower ratio of assets in place to growth options. Consistent with
this picture, Evans [6] presents em pirical evidence that firm growth
decreases with age, holding size constant. Following the traditional termi
nology, we refer to this explanation for differences between founder man
aged and other firms as the “life cycle” hypothesis.
The two explanations we consider are not mutually exclusive and are
not intended as competing hypotheses. Rather, they serve to motivate and
organize our examination of founder managed firms. Both explanations
indicate that factors not considered in static models of value maximizing
firms or of manager-owner agency conflicts play a role in financial decision
making. In particular, the control retention hypothesis postulates that dif
ferent managers in identical economic circumstances behave differently
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because of different attitudes toward the importance of control, and that
these differences are correlated with founder status.
III. GENERAL EFFECTS UNDER THE TWO HYPOTHESES

In this section we examine the general impact of the control retention effect
and the life cycle eflfect on financing, investment, and dividend decisions in
order to identify those areas in which decision making would be expected
to differ under each of the hypotheses.
A. Control Retention

We propose that the greater is the manager's preference for control,
the more the managers shy away from choices that tend to dilute their con
trol. Because managers are acting in their own self interests, however, the
investment, financing, and dividend decisions are interrelated.
1. Financing decisions. Control preference leads managers to favor
those forms of financing involving the least possible surrender of control to
new security holders. Thus, internal financing is preferable to debt, which
is preferable to equity financing. While this ordering follows Myers [21]
“pecking order” theory of capital structure, the point is not to establish an
absolute priority, but to predict differences in capital structure. Thus we
predict managers with a greater degree of control preference use more
internal financing, more debt and less equity than do other managers in
identical situations. Consistent with this hypothesis, Amihud, Lev and Travlos [1] argue that the choice of financing method in acquisitions is moti
vated by the insiders* desire to retain control. Bidders with large insider
holdings tend not to issue stock, but are more likely to issue cash.
The liquidity of the firm is affected by both the investment and financ
ing decisions. Investment in liquid assets reduces the firm's risk of default,
but also reduces the value of the equity and increases the likelihood of a
takeover. Papaioannou, Strock, and Travlos [22] examine the situations
under which the firm would likely carry excess liquidity (cash and securities
as a proportion of total assets).^ Because Uquidity reduces risk, reduces
future needs for external capital, and permits greater use of debt financing,
we predict managers with a greater degree of control preference hold
higher levels of liquidity than other managers.
2. Investment decisions. Managers with a strong preference for control
will be less inclined to undertake investment projects to the extent that the
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projects will require outside financing. Positive net present value projects
are rejected when the value to the manager of the loss of control resulting
from outside financing exceeds the value of their share of the project. Thus
we expect control preference to be inversely related to capital expenditures.
Control retention also affects the investment in intangible assets, such
as research and development and advertising expenditures. As with tangi
ble investment, a reduction in these outlays decreases the need for external
financing (i.e., increases internally available funds). Zeckhouser and Pound
[30] and Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn [12] recognize another control retaining
aspect of intangible investm ent. They argue intangible investm ent
increases the cost (and thus decreases the amount) of external monitoring
of the firm's management, which in turn decreases the supply of debt to the
firm. As debt financing implies less loss of control than does external
equity, and therefore is more desirable, we expect control preference to lead
to lower than average levels of intangible investment.
In addition to predicting lower levels of investment, the control reten
tion hypothesis predicts lower project risk. Managers are generally pre
sumed to be more risk averse than wealth maximizing shareholders because
a large portion of their wealth is firm-specific human capital. A preference
for retaining control provides the m anager with a further incentive to
reduce firm-specific risk: the loss of the firm is the loss of a controlling posi
tion. Again, although there are countervailing arguments, we are interested
in the comparative prediction that control preferring managers choose
lower risk projects than does the general population of managers.^
3.
Dividend decisions. The dividend decision is linked to both the
investment decision and the financing decision. Smaller dividends mean
more internal funds available for investment and less need for external
financing.
According to Easterbrook [5], by paying fewer dividends, and by min
imizing external financing, however, these firms would be less monitored
than other firms, and have lower valuation (higher “agency” costs). Thus,
in dividend policy, the manager desiring to retain control trades off the risk
of loss of control through external financing against the risk of a disciplinary
takeover. The greater is the manager's entrenchment and insulation firom
takeover, the lower dividend payment can be. Under the control retention
hypothesis, dividend payout is inversely related to control preference.^
B. Life Cycle

This study assumes that, if the control retention hypothesis is valid, its
effects should be observed among founder-managers. Since founders are.
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by definition, the first managers of their firms, founder managed firms
tend to be drawn from earher phases of the Ufa cycle. Thus we need to con
sider how this affects the predictions of the previous section. Characteriz
ing firms in these early phases as having rich growth opportunities, but
facing significant asymmetric information problems in financing, we dis
cuss in this section the effect of the life cycle on observed financing, invest
ment, and dividend decisions.
1. Financing decisions. Several authors have argued that the use of debt
is negatively related to a firm's growth and positively related to its size.^
Firms in the earlier phases of the life cycle are generally smaller and faster
growing than mature firms, and, by agency based arguments, are expected
to use less financial leverage. To the extent that “young” firms also have rel
atively more intense asymmetric information problems, they have difficulty
raising external funds, and make relatively greater use of internal sources
of capital. Kim and Sorenson [14], among others, document a negative
relation between growth and leverage; many studies have reported the pos
itive correlation between leverage and size.
Papaioannou, Strock, and Travlos [22] note that liquidity is affected by
the competitiveness of the firm's product market. In a highly competitive
environment, as exists in the early phases of the life cycle, the firm is unable
to earn positive economic rents. To survive, the firm either lowers product
price or reinvests cash flows into positive NPV projects and intangible
investments, rather than accumulate liquidity. Informational asymmetries
are greater in these firms, raising the cost and reducing the availability of
debt financing for those needs. Smaller liquid reserves result from the
higher cost of debt financing for high growth firms.
2. Investment decisions. Given the relatively richer set of investment
options, one expects firms in the early phases of the life cycle to exhibit
higher (proportional) tangible investment. Intangible investment, espe
cially research and development activity, indicates future growth opportu
nities. The availability of positive net present value projects precludes
accumulating liquid assets.
Risk will be higher for firms in the early phases of the life cycle for two
reasons. First, given the high degree of information asymmetry and the
importance of growth options, young firms are likely to be perceived as
being more risky by the market. Second, if founders are more entrepre
neurial oriented as suggested by Holmes and Schmitz [10] and if this mind
set involves a higher tolerance for risk, such firms should be riskier
3. Dividend decisions. The theoretical effects of life cycle on dividends
are not clear. On the one hand, dividend payouts should be small for young
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firms. Their investment opportunities are a more valuable use of available
funds than are dividends. Firms that rely on internal funds and reinvest
earnings have less “free cash flow” to distribute as dividends. Simple obser
vation shows growth stocks are traditionally low dividend stocks. On the
other hand, growth options exacerbate informational asymmetry problems.
Easterbrook [5] argues dividends reduce the resulting agency costs. More
over, signalling models of the firm imply that dividend increases reveal
management's expectations of higher future earnings. These asymmetric
informational arguments suggest higher dividend payments for younger
firms.®
C. Specific Variables

In this section we discuss the specific variables we use, and note the
individual prediction generated by each effect.
1. Financing decisions. We measure the use of debt financing as the ratio
of the book value of total assets to the book value of equity {LEVERAGE).
The control retention hypothesis predicts that LEVERAGE will be higher in
the founder sample; the life cycle hypothesis predicts it will be lower.
We measure liquidity with two variables, the current ratio (CA/CL) and
the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets {CASHTA). As
With LEVERAGE, the control retention hypothesis predicts higher values of
the two liquidity measures in the founder managed sample; the life cycle
hypothesis predicts lower values in the founder managed sample.
2. Investment decisions. We use two measures of tangible investment
activity. Capital expenditure {CAPEXP) is the ratio of capital expenditures
to total assets. The other measure of investment is based on the observation
that the assets of rapidly growing firms are newer than those of firms invest
ing more slowly. We measure average asset age {ASSETAGE) as the ratio of
reported accum ulated depreciation to depreciation expense. Since
CAPEXP and the rate of growth of the firm (measured here by G(EMPLOY),
the three year compound annual rate of growth in employees) are positively
associated with investment,the life cycle hypothesis predicts these values
will be higher in the founder managed sample, while control retention pre
dicts lower values. Because a larger value of ASSETAGE reflects slower,
older investment, the opposite predictions are made for this variable.
We m easure two aspects of intangible investm ent, advertising
{ADVERT) and research and development {R8cD). ADVERT is the ratio of
advertising expense to sales, and R8cD is the ratio of research and develop
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ment expense to sales. As was the case for tangible investment, the life cycle
theory predicts higher values in the founder managed sample, while the
control retention theory predicts lower values.
We measure firm specific risk {CONVAR) as the conditional variance
calculated from estimating the single index market model with daily stock
market returns. The control retention theory predicts founder managed
firms will have lower risk while the life cycle theory predicts higher risk for
them. We represent the market's perception of the risk-return tradeoff for
the stock with the two coefficients estimated from the single index market
model {ALPHA and BETA). As with CONVAR, the control retention theory
associates lower values of ALPHA and BETA with founder managed firms,
while the life cycle theory predicts higher values.
3.
Dividend decisions. We use total dividend payout {PAYOUT) and
common dividend yield {DIVYIELD) to measure dividend policy. The
former is calculated as the three year average of the ratio of total dividends
paid to income before extraordinary items, and the latter is calculated as
the three year average of the ratio of common dividends paid to closing
price at fiscal year end. The control retention theory predicts lower values
of these variables for founder managed firms; the life cycle theory is ambig
uous.
Table 1 provides a summary of the specific variables with the predicted
effects of founder management under the two hypotheses.
IV

SAMPLE AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The sample is drawn from the “200 Best Small Companies in America”,
compiled in the November 14, 1988 issue of Forbes.'^ The Forbes data
includes information about the chief executive of each firm, including age,
tenure with the firm, tenure as CEO, salary, percentage held of the firm's
stock, and whether the CEO is the founder. To obtain values for the finan
cial attributes, we also require the firm to be included in the Compustat
annual industrial files and in either the CRSP NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ
daily returns files. All accounting variables are measured at the end of the
1986 fiscal year The single index market model is estimated over the 200
trading days ending December 31, 1986. A total of 75 firms satisfy these
constraints.
M anagerial control may stem from sources other than the CEO's
founder status or stockholdings. For each of the firms, we also examined
Standard and Poor's Stock Reports to identify the percentage of stock held by
officers and directors, family trusts, and other “allies.” Moody's industrial
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Table 1
Predicted Sign under the Two Hypotheses
of the Relation of Each Decision
Variable to Founder M anagem ent
Control Retention

Life Cycle

LEVERAGE

+

-

CA/CL

+

-

CASHTA

4-

-

CAPEXP

-

+

G(EMPLOY)

-

+

ASSETAGE

+

-

ADVERT

-

+

R&D

-

+

CONVAR

-

+

ALPHA

-

+

BETA

-

PAYOUT

-

+
p

DIVYIELD

-

?

Variable"^

Notes:

Definition and calculation o f variables:
Tangible investment:
CAPEXP
= Capital Expenditures / Total Assets.
ASSETAGE = Accumulated Depreciation / Depreciation
Expense.
G(EMPLOY) = Three Year Compound Annual Rate O f
Growth In Employees.
Intangible investment:
ADVERT
=
Advertising Expense / Sales.
R&D
=
Research and Development Expense/Sales.
Market perception o f risk:
ALPHA
Intercept Term Estimated Erom The Single
Index Market Model.
BETA
Market Coefficient Estimated From The
Single Index Market Model.
CONVAR =
Conditional \kriance In Daily Returns
From The Single Index Market Model.
Leverage:
LEVERAGE =
Book Value Of Total Assets / Book Value O f
Common Equity.
Liquidity;
CA/CL
Current Assets / Current Liabilities.
CASHTA
=
Cash And Short Term Investments / Total
Assets.
Dividend policy:
PAYOUT
=
Three Year Average O f Total Dividends
P^id/Income Before Extraordinary Items.
DIVYIELD =
Three Year Average o f Common Dividends
Paid / Closing Price At Fiscal Year End.
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manuals also were examined to identify which of the firms had dual classes
of stock or had “poison pill” provisions.
T he 75 firm sample contains 30 firms in which the chief executive is
also the founder. Thirty-one two-digit SIC codes are represented in the
sample. Although there does not appear to be any industry clustering in
the overall sample, founder managed firms exhibit some clustering (10 of
the 30 firms) into the non-financial service industries (primary SIC codes
over 7000), compared to only four of the 45 nonfounder managed firms.
To control for possible industry effects in the analyses, we create a service
industry binary variable (one if the SIC code is 7000 or greater, zero other
wise).^
Table 2 presents the means for the variables of interest described
above, and for other general attributes of the sample, broken down by
founder status. The right-most two columns of the table displays the ^-statistic and the associated “p-value” (the significance probability of t) for each
variable for the test of differences between the means of the two groups.
The growth rate, G(EMPLOY), is measured as the three year compound
annual rate of growth in employees.
Examination of the data reveal that the two samples differ in several
respects. Looking first at the decision variables, we find that the sign for
the differences in ASSETAGE is as predicted by the life cycle hypothesis,
while those for ADVERT, PAYOUT and DIVYIELD behave as predicted by
the control retention hypothesis. Differences between the two samples for
the other variables are statistically not different from zero at the 0.10 level.
A comparison of the remaining variables indicates that the samples
differ in other dimensions as well. The data reveal founders to be older,
and to hold a greater percentage of the firm's stock than nonfounders.
Although founders have been CEOs longer than nonfounders, neither
their total tenure with the firm nor their salary (which includes any bonus)
is significantly different from that of nonfounders. Five of the firms headed
by nonfounders have dual voting classes of stock, and two have poison pill
provisions; founder managed firms are less likely to use these “entrench
m ent” methods. Both groups have sizable percentages of the common
stock in the hands of allies: officers, directors, family trusts, and employee
trusts. In seven of the founder managed firms, compared to five of the non
founder managed firms, more than 50% of the common shares is controlled
by allies.
Founder m anaged firms are seen to be younger than nonfounder
managed firms in that they are smaller, with (slightly) higher growth rates
in sales and employees, and newer fixed assets, on average. For the three
estimates from the single index market model {ALPHA, BETA, or CONVAR),
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Table 2
Means of Various Characteristics of the Samples by Founder Status
of Chief Executive Officer with Test Statistics for Differences in
Means between the Two Samples
Attribute

A.

Founder as CEO Nonfounder as
(N = 3 0 )
CEO (N = 4 5 )

0.960
0.075
0.307
0.742
0.101
0.034
0.026
0.378
0.000
0.000

0.108
0.001
1.226

0.048
0.001
1.029

1.670
-1 .3 2 4
1.040

0.105
0.192
0.302

74.000
69.533
1.648
26.870

125.156
102.578
1.871
21.303

-3 .0 4 0
-1 .6 0 2
-0 .6 2 4
1.495

0.003
0.114
0.534
0.139

53.6
19.9
10.6
341.5
8.31

2.806
1.106
4.398
-0 .8 5 9
2.795

0.006
0.272
0.000
0.393
0.007

1.399

0.166

58.9
22.7
19.7
304.2
17.85

Other Control Entrenchment Characteristics

Dual Classes
Poison Pills
Allies* % Owned
No. > 50% Owned
Note:

0.051
1.829
1.030
0.331
1.661
-2 .1 5 6
-2 .2 8 6
-0 .9 0 6
-4 .6 1 2
-4 .1 5 7

Chief Executive Officer Characteristics

CEO's Age
Years with Company
Years as CEO
Salary ($M)
Ownership (%)
E.

1.648
3.200
0.204
0.095
10.700
5.240
0.024
0.024
0.220
0.014

Other Firm Characteristics

Sales ($MM)
Assets ($MM)
Shareholders (M)
Sales Growth (%)
D.

1.642
4.378
0.249
0.103
16.280
4.048
0.009
0.017
0.065
0.005

Market Model Coefficients

CONVAR(xlOO)
ALPHA
BETA
C.

p value for t

Decision Variables

LEVERAGE
CA/CL
CASHTA
CAPEXP
G(EMPLOY)
ASSETAGE
ADVERT
R&D
PAYOUT
DIVYIELD
B.

t-statistic

2
0
29.03
7

5
2
22.24
5

* Management, insiders, and allies of management.

none of the differences between the two sample groups is statistically signif
icant at the 0.10 level.
Because we want to isolate the effect of founder status as cleanly as pos
sible, we report the results of cross-sectional regressions of the various deci
sion variables on founder status (FOUNDER) and a collection of control
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variables. Since we are interested in the effect of founder status on control
retaining behavior, we include another measure of the degree of managerial
control (STOCK). We also must control for measurable dimensions of the
firm's life cycle. For this, we include two proxy measures for phase of the
life cycle, G(EMPLOY) and SIZE. Specifically, the regression analysis takes
the form;
Y = Bq + Bi*FOUNDER + B 2 *STOCK + B^*G(EMPLOY) + B^*SIZE

Here, Y represents any of the nine decision variables or three market
model measures. T he right-hand variables control for the effects of
founder status, manager ownership, and stage of the firm in the life cycle.®
We do not assume any structure other than that of the two hypotheses. We
consider neither a system of simultaneous equations, nor any interaction
terms. Our estimated models are the reduced forms of any such a system
across the policy variables.
The regressor variable of most interest is FOUNDER, a binary (0,1)
variable, which takes the value one if the CEO is the founder. The predic
tions of the previous section concern the sign on the coefficient of this vari
able resulting from control retention or life cycle considerations, as
depicted in Table 1.
The extent of the CEO‘s ownership of the firm potentially reveals the
CEO's desire to retain control. The greater the value placed on retaining
control, the greater will be the CEO's stake in the firm. Manager ownership
interest in the firm is measured by STOCK, the percentage of the firm's com
mon owned by the CEO. Table 2 shows that founders own significantly
more of their firm's common stock than do nonfounders in the sample. The
variable STOCK is included to separate differences in control preference
related to founder status from those associated with ownership structure.^®
Life cycle effects are reflected in two variables, G(EMPLOY) and SIZE.
G(EMPLOY) is a proxy for the growth aspects of life cycle, and equals the
three year compound annual rate of growth in employees. The natural log
arithm of annual sales is included as an independent variable, SIZE, to con
trol for effects of differences in size. Table 2 indicates that the founder
managed firms are significantly smaller than nonfounder managed firms in
the sample, and have a numerically greater growth rate. The coefficients
of both variables are evaluated in light of the predictions of the life cycle
hypothesis.
The correlation coefficients for the four regressor variables are in
Table 3. FOUNDER is significantly negatively correlated with SIZE, signif
icantly positively correlated with STOCK, and weakly positively correlated
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Table 3
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Four Independent
Regressors with Significance Probabilities in Parentheses
FOUNDER
STOCK

STOCK

G(EMPLOY)

SIZE

0.330
(0.004)

0.191
(0.101)
0.016
(0.893)

-0.373
(0.001)
0.058
(0.618)
-0.093
(0.426)

G(EMPLOY)

Notes:

Definition and calculation o f variables:
FOUNDER = 1 if the CEO is also a founder of the firm;
0 otherwise.
STOCK
= the percentage of shares outstanding owned
by the CEO.
G(EMPLOY) = the 3-year compound annual growth rate in
employees.
SIZE
= logarithm (In) o f sales.

with G(EMPLOY), all consistent with founder management being associated
with earlier stages of the firm's life cycle. All other correlation coefficients
are not significant.
The final issue we consider is whether founders utilize their privileged
position to extract greater direct compensation from the firm. The benefits
to retaining control can be tangible, reflected in higher than average salary.
We use the same estimating equation to examine the CEO's salary as a func
tion FOUNDER, STOCK, G(EMPLOY) and SIZE.
V. RESULTS

The results of the regressions are shown in Table 4. For each regression, the
overall F statistic, its significance probability, and the adjusted
for the
regression are included, in addition to the estimates of the coefficients and
the associated significance probabilities for the four regressors. The esti
mated regression coefficients are stable to addition or deletion among the
regressors. As was the case in the simple comparison of the two samples,
both control retention and life cycle effects are seen at work.
The regression for LEVERAGE is not very inform ative about the
hypotheses, in that the overall regression is not significant. The estimated
coefficient of SIZE is positive, a reasonable result since larger firms are
expected to have relatively higher debt levels. The relation between insider
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Table 4
Regression Results for Effects on Firm Attributes of Founder Status, Fraction
of Shares Owned by the CEO, Employee Growth Rate, and Size.^
Model: K = Sq + B^*FOUNDER + B2*ST0CK + B^*G(EMPLOY) + B^*SIZE
Dependent
Variable

LEVERAGE
CA'CL

Br

ASSETAGE

0.513

0.010

0.123

1.740

(0.562)

(0.794)

(0.208)

(0.980)

(0.050)

(0.151)

23.792

0.356

-1.404

2.567

-1.127

6.116

(0.000)

(0.564)

(0.472)

(0.160)

(0.000)

(0.000)

1.209

-0.025

0.137

0.273

-0.057

2.673

(0.007)

(0.616)

(0.380)

(0.063)

(0.019)

(0.039)

-0.390

0.007

0.188

0.013

0.025

3.797

(0.059)

(0.754)

(0.012)

(0.844)

(0.025)

(0.008)

12.790

-1.412

3.199

-6.522

-0.387

4.727

(0.234)

(0.002)

(0.034)

(0.038)

(0.135)

(0.002)

0.005

-0.018

0.033

0.011

0.001

1.312
(0.274)

(0.054)

(0.260)

(0.692)

(0.854)

0.046

-0.007

-0.041

0.053

-0.001

2.125

(0.540)

(0.431)

(0.132)

(0.038)

(0.743)

(0.087)

1.146

0.026

-0.017

-0.106

-0.059

5.201

(0.000)

(0.431)

(0.870)

(0.274)

(0.000)

(0.001)

0.536

-0.068

0.084

0.062

-0.023

1.161

(0.076)

(0.046)

(0.431)

(0.534)

(0.162)

(0.336)

-3.916

0.288

-0.328

2.245

0.257

5.692

(0.030)

(0.154)

(0.605)

(0.000)

(0.009)

(0.000)

-0.406

-0.090

-0.242

-0.283

0.037

7.066

(0.289)

(0.041)

(0.079)

(0.028)

(0.081)

(0.000)

-3.265

-0.518

-1.130

-2.458

0.274

7.589

(0.191)

(0.068)

(0.206)

(0.004)

(0.046)

(0.000)

(0.948)
R&D
CONVAR"
ALPHA‘S

PAYOUT
DIVYLD''

Notes:

B,

0.034

ADVERT

BETA

B,

-0.659

CASHTA
CAPEXP

Bn

0.038
0.217
0.083
0.131
0.168
0.017
0.057
0.185
0.009
0.202
0.247
0.263

® Numbers in parentheses are significance probabilities for the tests that Bj = 0
(f o r j = 0,...,4), and that F = 0.

'’ BsisxlO^
All coefficients are xlO^, except

is xlO^

ownership and leverage is not significant, a result contrary to that of Jensen,
Solberg, and Zorn [12].
Similarly, in the regressions involving CA/CL and CASHTA only the
coefficient of SIZE is significant. Liquidity is an inverse function of firm
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size, inconsistent with the Ufe cycle concept, but not evidence of control
retention behavior. The significant coefficient for G(EMPLOY) in the
CASHTA regression is an industry effect, this coefficient becoming not sinificantly different from zero when the service industry variable is included.
The somewhat greater liquidity of the founder manager sample indicated
in Table 2 is apparently unrelated to founder status.
The variables measuring tangible investment generally respond to life
cycle effects. In the regression involving capital expenditure, while the
coefficient of FOUNDER is not significant, those for STOCK and SIZE are
positive and significant. By construction, STOCK captures effects of the
direct voting control of the manager Thus its estimated coefficient is con
sistent with a Leland and Pyle signalling with insider ownership. The pos
itive relation between SIZE and CAPEXP is inconsistent, however, with the
presumption of the life cycle hypothesis that growth options decline with
size.^^
In the regression onASSETAGE, the coefficient oiFOUNDER is signif
icant and in the direction predicted by the life cycle hypothesis. Also con
sistent with the life cycle hypothesis, the coefficient of G(EMPLOY) is
negative and significant, indicating lower growth being associated with
older assets.
The results for the measures of intangible investment are inconclusive.
In the regression for ADVERT, the regressors explain little of the variability
in advertising expense. Nonetheless, the FOUNDER coefficient is signifi
cant and negative, indicating founder managed firms undertake relatively
less of this form of intangible investment, weakly consistent with control
retention behavior In the regression for R&D, neither the coefficient of
FOUNDER nor of STOCK is significant.^^ The significant positive coeffi
cient of G(EMPLOY) is consistent with higher growth being associated with
greater expenditures for research and development.
The estimates of the risk-return tradeoff from the market model are
inconclusive. T he ALPHA regression is not significant, although the coeffi
cient for FOUNDER indicates the market penalizes founder m anaged
firms, consistent with control retention. The coefficients on SIZE for the
two risk measures are both significant, but with opposite signs.
The dividend policy variables most clearly reflect control retention
behavior Even after controlling for life cycle effects, the estimated coeffi
cients of FOUNDER for both measures are significantly negative. Founder
managed firms pay smaller dividends and have smaller dividend yields
than other firms.
The regression estimates for the analysis of the CEO‘s salary are dis
played in Table 5. After controlling for the firm's size and growth, and for
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Table 5
Regression Results for Effects on Salary of Founder Status, Fraction of
Shares Owned by the CEO, Employee Growth Rate, and Size.^

Model: Salary = Bq + Bi*FOUNDER + B^^STOCK + B^*G(EMPLOY) + B^*SIZE
Bo
-1014.85
(0.018)
Notes:

-11.05
(0.817)

239.13
(0.116)

0.559

^4
72.28

(0.691)

(0.002)

F

,2

4.037

0.141

(0.005)

Numbers in parentheses are significance probabilities for the tests that -Sj = 0
(f b r j = 0,...,4), and that F = 0.

Bsis Xloa

the CEO's stockholdings, we find no significant relation between founder
status and SALARY. Therefore, with respect to direct compensation, there is
no evidence of self-dealing behavior by the founders in this sample.
In summary, even controlling for insider ownership, the firm's rate of
growth, and its size, we find some financial decisions are influenced by
founder status. In the area of tangible investments, the life cycle effects
seem dominant. Weak evidence of control retention is more found in the
results for intangible investment activity. The greatest evidence of control
retention is with dividends. Liquidity and firm-specific risk do not appear
to be affected by either hypothesis.
VI. CONCLUSION

The findings of Morck, Shleifner, and Vishny [18, 19, 20], Johnson et al.
[13], and others suggests founder status of the CEO adversely affects the
value of the firm. We examine the effects of founder status on the financing,
investment, and dividend policies of the firm to determine if founders'
tighter control of their firms leads to different decision making behavior, or
if the firms' stage in the life cycle dominates the decisions.
A comparison of samples of founder managed and nonfounder man
aged firms reveals differences in the financial behavior of the two sets of
firms. These differences persist even after controlling for variables
designed to measure the firm's stage in the “life cycle” and other factors.
In some dimensions (notably tangible investment) the differences appear to
reflect life cycle effects. To the extent that this occurs, founder status is still
serving as a proxy for life cycle status. That is, the control variables do not
completely capture the life cycle effects.
In other cases (dividends and advertising) the observed differences are
consistent with the control retention hypothesis and not the life cycle
hypothesis. We interpret this as evidence that, in at least some areas, there
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are differences in managerial behavior more easily attributed to the m an
ager's status as a founder than to exogenous economic circumstances. This
evidence confirms suggestions in previous literature that such differences
m ight exist. Moreover, our findings have consequences for theories of
entrepreneurship, such as those proposed by Holmes and Schmitz, as well
as for the financial analysis and management of founder run firms.
NOTES
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

This relation does not necessarily imply an inefficiency in founders' management.
Shleifer and Vishny [26] propose there can exist manager-specific implicit contracts
between the executive and employees, suppliers, customers, etc., the value o f which is
captured in the executive's compensation (defined to include entrenchment). If the
executive dies in office, the firm gains the contracts, and thus their value; if the
executive is fired, he/she retains the contracts. There is evidence, however, that the
relation observed by Johnson et al. is not a founder effect, but is a result o f the founder's
usually large ownership stake. Slovin and Shuska [27] find the market's response to the
death o f an inside blockholder to be a function of the size of the block and independent
of the deceased's founder status.
Their concern is with insider ownership. While finding no relation between liquidity
and managerial ownership, they report liquidity is positively related to a Tobin's q ratio
(their proxy for positive rents) and intangible investment (specialized resources and
information), and negatively related to leverage and the length o f the cash cycle
(operating constraints).
Consistent with our prediction, Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn [12] extend their monitoring
argument to firm specific risk and the financing decision. Decreasing the firm's
business risk decreases the costs o f m onitoring m anagem ent, and increases the
availability o f debt financing.
Under special circumstances, however, a founder's need to retain numerical control of
voting rights can lead to an increase in dividend payouts. The Wall Street Journal
(February 3, 1992, p. B7) reports that Turner Broadcasting System would pay its first
dividend since 1975, most likely to provide funds for its founder's personal projects.
The founder, Ted Turner, had been selling his stock for this purpose, but in the process
had reduced his holdings to 56% o f the voting control.
This literature is reviewed in Harris and Raviv [8].
Historical evidence can overshadow theoretical ambiguities. Pilotte [24], for recent
example, uses dividend policy as an inverse proxy for growth opportunities, rejecting
alternative interpretations o f dividends as a proxy for informational asymmetry or
liquidity.
These 200 firms are clearly not a random set, and drawing the sample from the “best”
companies may create a selection bias. This sample, however, is appropriate for the
structure of the analysis. The regressions assume that the CEO's desire to retain control
affects his or her investment and financing decisions, and thus affects the financial
characteristics of the firm. This structure is reasonable given the focus on founder
status as the proxy for preference for control. An alternative argument (related to that
of Leland and Pyle [16]), is that the firm's characteristics influence the CEO's desire to
retain control and ownership status. It is easier to want to retain control o f a successful
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8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
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firm than an unsuccessful one. By sampling from a group o f “best” firms, firms that are
all successful, the likelihood o f this alternative structural relationship is reduced.
We would have pieferred a matching procedure to control for industry effects, but that
is not feasible here. Founder CEOs are not distributed proportionately across
industries, at least not in the Forbes data. A test of independence between one-digit SIC
codes and founder status (one if founder, zero otherwise) has a chi-square of 13.427,
with eight degrees o f freedom, significant at the 0.10 level. When service industry
classification is also reduced to a binary variable (1 if the SIC code is 7000 or greater,
zero otherw^ise), the chi-square is 7.084, significant at the 0.01 level.
To determine the sensitivity o f our results to industry effects, we repeat the analyses
including the service industiy binary variable as an independent variable. Except as
noted, the results are unaffected by the inclusion o f this variable.
All analyses are repeated redefining STOCK to include the percentage o f the firm's
common owned by allies, including the CEO, in order to minimize the effects o f limits
to founder wealth, and to more closely measure the shares controlled by the manager.
The results are unaffected by this variation, and are not reported. Table 2 indicates that
while the ownership by allies is greater for the founder managed firms, the mean is not
significantly different from that for the nonfounder managed firms in the sample.
One possible explanation recognizes that all these firms are small firms. Within small
firms, a relatively larger firm may have an advantage in exploiting tangible growth
opportunities.
When the stockholdings o f allies are used instead o f STOCK, the estimated coefficient
on this variable becomes positive and significant, consistent with the control retention
hypothesis. The coefficient o f FOUNDER remains negative.
When the stockholdings o f allies replace STOCK, the estimated coefficient on R&fD is
negative and significant, consistent with control retention.
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